On Obama’s Foreign Policy

I was going to post this on Tuesday, but I thought it would be too much rain on Obama’s parade. Now, I don’t mean to be a downer, but I think it’s important to discuss the constraints on Obama’s foreign policy. As much as he wants change, it might be a bit difficult. Here’s an issue-by-issue analysis.

Issue: Iranian nuclear ambitions. Constraints: regional geopolitics. Obama’s position: open to dialogue. Likely outcome: some discussion, but much of the same. Reason: Iran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and Israel is unlikely to become okay with a nuclear Iran. Watch for Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities with US complicity.

Issue: Iraq. Constraints: domestic issues. Obama’s position: timed withdrawal. Likely outcome: A slower withdrawal than people expect. Reason: As US troops withdraw from Iraq, the sectarian violence that has been plaguing the country will continue, and Iraqi security forces are not ready to take over. Expect the US to withdraw some troops, but keep a good number.

Issue: Afghanistan. Constraints: Taliban insurgency and Pakistan border issues. Obama’s position: prosecuting a successful, and brief, war in Afghanistan. Likely outcome: A surge, and a long war. Reason: The conflict in Afghanistan is intractible, and with allies like Canada set to withdraw their troops, there will be more work for the US. The Pakistan issue is massive, and isn’t currently being addressed. Watch for a long war, and increased pressure, and possible troop deployments in Pakistan.

Issue: Pakistan. Constraints: Domestic instability, a rogue security service, and a rough neighbourhood. Obama’s position: unknown. Likely outcome: State failure and increased insurgent activity in Afghanistan and India. Reason: The ISI and other groups are running wild through Pakistan, which lacks the institutions to make a successful comeback. The US will put pressure on Pakistan, and it will be unable to constrain the many disparate groups pressing for its disintegration. Watch for a very unstable neighbourhood, with increasing intervention on the borders of Pakistan, and perhaps into Pakistan proper.

Essentially, we’re not going to see huge change in Obama’s foreign policy. It’s too bad, but there are too many constraints, both domestic and international, on his policies and programs. Interesting areas to watch will be Cuba, Russia and Iran. Let’s hope for the best!

Israel’s Real Strategic Intent

Reading the coverage of the Israel-Hamas war over the last couple of weeks, I’ve been struck by one thing: my inability to identify what Israel’s real strategic intent was in invading Gaza.

The trouble is, riding Gaza of Hamas is not as easy as invading Gaza and killing Hamas militants. Hamas is a robust, irregular movement which, as long as there is support, will continue to resist Israel and pose a military threat.

Now, something occurred to me the other day. What if Israel is weakening Hamas before a larger, more important conflict? Say with Iran over the Bushehr nuclear reactor? It would make sense to weaken your enemies before launching a strategic attack on another enemy, one whose main military power rests in irregular forces such as Hamas and Hezbollah. What do you think?

Israel’s Invasion of Gaza: A Non-cooperative game theory perspective.

The players: Israel, Hamas, the international community
The rules: Are there any?
The outcomes: Israel achieves strategic aims (destruction of Hamas?); Israel does not achieve strategic aims (defeat by Hamas); the international community intervenes
The payoffs: expected utility functions of possible outcomes

Arbitrarily assigning values to each outcome:
Israel achieves strategic aims = 1
Israel does not achieve strategic aims = -1 (I’d argue this might be a bigger ‘loss’…)
International community intervenes = -1
International community does not intervene = 1

Probabilities (again, assigned arbitrarily):
The probability of the international community intervening in the conflict: 
Probability of intervention = .3
Probability of no intervention = .7
Probability of Israel achieving strategic aims = .8
Probability of Israel not achieving strategic aims = .2

Note that the probability of Israel achieving its strategic aims is a function of whether or not the international community intervenes; therefore,

E(U of Israel achieving strategic aims) = (P of no intervention)(-1)[P(Israel achieves aims)(1) + P(Israel does not achieve aims)(-1)]
= (.7)(1)[(.8)(1)+(.2)(-1)
= .42

I’m going to keep working on this and see if I can’t make some sense of it…;

What keeps me up at night.

Yossi Klein Halevi (The New Republic) has an article in Saturday’s Globe and Mail in which he argues that an nuclear-armed Iran will strike Israel. Now, the idea of Iran with a nuclear device is chilling, but not for the reasons Mr. Halevi describes. He suggests that Iran could develop a ‘nuclear suitcase’, enabling Iran to smuggle it into Israel’s borders. First of all, Iran has a fairly sophisticated SRBM and MRBM program, which could deliver a nuclear payload. Second of all, the technology needed to develop a suitcase-sized device is significantly more sophisticated than the crude device the Iranians are likely trying to develop at the moment….

Second of all, Halevi’s characterization of the Iranian regime as a “lunatic regime in Tehran, driven by messianic theology and hatred of Zionism…”. While the Iranian regime may at times appear to be acting illogically, this characterization is dangerous as it oversimplifies Iranian strategic though. Iran is torn between yes, a theocratic foundation, but also realist IR sensibilities, plus is constrained by numerous power centers. Describing it as Mr. Halevi has implies a united, single foreign policy bent on the destruction of Israel, which is not at all the case. Certainly, elements exist within Iranian FP circles that subscribe to these sentiments, but this is no where near the majority.

Despite Halevi’s flawed logic in relation to Iran’s strategic thought and nuclear development, he does make one excellent point: that Israel is probably not particularly pleased about the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. What Israel decides to do, with US implicit or tacit support, will define Middle-Eastern politics for the next decade, if not longer. So we watch and wait.

The Future of Nuclear Weapons

Something about the story from the BBC about the UK selling its last remaining shares in its nuclear weapons production capability to an American company strikes be as a touch dystopic.

Call me old fashioned, but I think that weapons production should be a native capability – Iran would probably agree with me on that one. Alliances can shift quickly, especially with strategic issues such as nuclear weapons. I also find it fascinating (and disturbing) that nuclear weapons are produced by for-profit companies.